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FIRST AMENDMENT: ZONING OF ADULT BUSINESS
NO CURE-ALL
Zoning ordinances, although non-discriminatory on their face, will
be given close scrutiny by the courts to determine if their impact on con-
stitutionally protected rights is justified. In Ebel v. City of Corona,' the
Ninth Circuit held that the owner of an adult bookstore was entitled to a
preliminary injunction to restrain the city from enforcing allegedly non-
discriminatory zoning ordinances which restricted adult-oriented busi-
nesses to certain areas and which, if enforced, would have meant closing
down her business.2
Helen Ebel, plaintiff and appellant, opened an adult bookstore
arcade in Corona, California, in July, 1981. At the time, hers was the
only adult bookstore in the city. Two months later, on September 16,
1981, the city council of Corona adopted zoning ordinances regulating
the selling of sex-oriented materials and the location of sex-oriented busi-
nesses. The restrictions on location were designed to keep such busi-
nesses away from facilities frequented by minors, such as schools,
recreation centers, churches, and parks.3 In addition, the ordinances
granted the owners of non-conforming businesses time to relocate.
On September 30, 1981, the city manager of Corona informed Ebel
that she would have to relocate her adult bookstore. Ebel filed a com-
plaint against the city and other parties on December 14, 1981. In her
complaint, she alleged that the zoning ordinances violated her rights
under the first and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitu-
tion.4 Ebel sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the city from forc-
ing her to relocate during the disposition of the suit.5
The district court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction.
The court ruled that Ebel had failed to prove a substantial likelihood of
success on the merits and had not shown that she would suffer irrepara-
ble harm if the motion were denied. The court found that there were
1. 698 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1983).
2. Id. at 393.
3. Id. at 391 nn.1 & 2.
4. The first amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
freedom of speech .... " Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment provides that "[n]o State
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."
5. Ebel, 698 F.2d at 391.
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alternative sites available for Ebel's business (the zoning ordinances did
not prohibit adult bookstores outright); that Ebel had not proved that the
ordinances restricted the availability of adult material in Corona; and
finally that Ebel had not demonstrated that the ordinances constituted a
ban on adult bookstores there.6
On February 25, 1982, the motions panel of the Ninth Circuit
granted Ebel a temporary injunction restraining the city from enforcing
its ordinance, pending appeal. The city moved to vacate Ebel's tempo-
rary injunction. The city's motion was denied on May 3, 1982.' On Feb-
ruary 1, 1983, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court order and
directed it to issue a preliminary injunction, pending trial on the merits,
and remanded the case for trial.8
The test for issuance of a preliminary injunction adopted by the
Ninth Circuit is contained in Aguirre v. Chula Vista Sanitary Service and
Sani-Tainer, Inc.:
[A] preliminary injunction should issue upon a clear showing of
either (1) probable success on the merits and possible irrepara-
ble injury, or (2) sufficiently serious questions going to the mer-
its to make them a fair ground for litigation and a balance of
hardships tipping decidedly toward the party requesting the
preliminary relief.9
In denying the preliminary injunction, the district court applied the
first alternative of this either/or test, that is, probable success on the mer-
its and possible irreparable injury. The Ninth Circuit, however, applied
the second alternative and determined that there were serious questions
concerning the merits of Ebel's claim which presented fair grounds for
litigation. 1o
The court looked first at the alleged violation of Ebel's constitution-
ally protected right to free speech. Writing for the court, Judge Goodwin
stated two basic tenets upon which decisions are based when the consti-
tutionality of legislation is questioned. The first is that the courts apply
6. Id.
7. Id. at 392.
8. Id. at 393.
9. Aguirre v. Chula Vista Sanitary Service and Sani-Tainer, Inc., 542 F.2d 779, 781 (9th
Cir. 1976) (emphasis in original) (employment discrimination action against garbage disposal
company by Spanish-surnamed employees). This test was quoted from Gresham v. Chambers,
501 F.2d 687, 691 (2d Cir. 1974) (civil rights suit brought by community college faculty mem-
ber against college president and chairman of board of trustees to enjoin appointment of asso-
ciate dean; denial of preliminary injunction upheld).
10. Ebel, 698 F.2d at 392.
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"strict scrutiny to statutes that impinge on first amendment rights.""
The second is that a state or local legislative body must have compelling
state interests in order to justify laws that regulate an unprotected activ-
ity but which also incidentally limit free expression.' 2
Judge Goodwin compared the situation in Corona to that in the city
of Detroit, presented in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., the lead-
ing case concerning the regulation of adult businesses through zoning. 3
Ordinances adopted by the city of Detroit in 1962 and 1972 classified
theaters as "adult" and made them subject to zoning restrictions based
on the content of the movies they featured. The issue in Mini Theatres
was whether this content-based classification was unconstitutional.' 4
The United States Supreme Court stated that such a classification would
not always be held to violate the first amendment.'" There would be no
violation so long as, in passing the ordinances, "the need for absolute
neutrality by the government was met."' 6 Additionally, the ordinances
could not have the effect of totally suppressing communication in this
area. However, proof of government neutrality alone would not be suffi-
cient to establish constitutionality of the ordinances. The scrutiny would
also have to reveal that the ordinances were justified by compelling state
interests. '"
11. Id. The court cited Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (per
Douglas, J.) (holding a fee or poll tax violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment). The Virginia Board court stated: "We have long been mindful that where fun-
damental rights and liberties are asserted under the Equal Protection Clause, classifications
which might invade or restrain them must be closely scrutinized and carefully confined."
12. Ebel, 698 F.2d at 392. Activities which do not in themselves involve the exercise of
rights guaranteed in the United States Constitution, for example, the right of assembly or the
right to practice the religion of one's choice (amend. I), are considered unprotected activities.
In Ebel's case, the operation of her business at a particular location was not a constitutionally
protected activity. However, her constitutionally protected freedom of expression became in-
volved because the zoning ordinances regulated businesses based on the type of material they
sold or displayed.
13. 427 U.S. 50, 56 (1976) (Stevens, J.) (holding zoning ordinances valid and appropriate
locational restrictions despite their impact on free expression).
14. Id. at 52.
15. Id. at 71, 72. The Court outlined other areas in which classification of speech by
content with ensuing restrictions has been upheld as non-violative of first amendment rights.
Among these were different standards of proof in libel cases, depending on the status of the
person libeled, N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); state restictions on highway
billboards, Markham Advertising Co. v. Washington, 73 Wash. 2d 405, 439 P.2d 248 (1968),
appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 316 (1969); and FTC regulation of advertising, FTC v. National
Comm'n on Egg Nutrition, 517 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1975).
16. Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 67. Justice Stevens further wrote that, "[a] government's
regulation of communication may not be affected by sympathy or hostility for the point of view
being expressed by the communicator."
17. Id. at 70-71. The Detroit Council was concerned about the effect of a concentration of
1986]
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The situation in Corona was quite different from that in Detroit.
There were at least forty adult theatres in Detroit that were affected by
the ordinances, while Ebel's was the only adult bookstore in Corona.
The Detroit ordinances contained a grandfather clause which permitted
existing businesses to continue operating, but Corona's did not. The De-
troit ordinances were designed to disperse adult businesses, not to sup-
press them. However, because Ebel's was the only adult bookstore in
Corona, the effect of the ordinances was suppression or restriction of ac-
cess to adult fare. 18
Judge Goodwin stated that, at the trial on the merits, Corona's case
would hinge upon proof of some compelling state interest that would
justify this infringement on Ebel's rights. Ultimately, the city would have
to prove that the ordinances were designed to prevent some specific harm
and the likelihood of such harm occurring.
1 9
The Ninth Circuit then addressed Ebel's contention that the city's
procedure in enacting the ordinances violated her due process rights.
Her primary argument was that the city did not have adequate factual
justification to enact the ordinances. 20 The court, rather summarily, dis-
missed this argument, stating that enactment of a zoning ordinance is a
legislative act. Legislative bodies have great latitude in this area, and the
Ninth Circuit found no error in the trial court's holding.2'
Turning to the fourteenth amendment issue, the Ninth Circuit ex-
amined the district court record and found sufficient evidence to raise the
question whether the city had violated Ebel's right to equal protection.
Ebel had contended that the sole and specific purpose of the Corona zon-
ing ordinances was to harass her and prevent her from exercising her first
amendment right to freedom of speech. Among the evidence in support
of this claim were public hearings on the ordinances at which testimony
directly concerned Ebel's bookstore, the preamble to the ordinances
which specifically mentioned the bookstore, a statement by the planning
commissioner that he would like to see the bookstore out of Corona, and
adult businesses on a neighborhood's property values, crime rate, and on relocation of other
businesses out of the area. The desire to preserve neighborhoods from urban blight was con-
sidered a compelling state interest.
18. Ebel, 698 F.2d at 392.
19. Id. at 393.
20. Id. at 392. Since hers was the only adult bookstore, if not the only adult-oriented
business, in Corona, Ebel seems to have had reason to argue that the city lacked sufficient first-
hand evidence of the harm caused by such businesses.
21. Id. at 393. For this proposition, the court cited Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., Inc.,
426 U.S. 668, 673 (1976) (Burger, C.J.) (holding that a city charter amendment requiring land
use changes to be approved by a referendum did not violate a landowner's due process rights).
remanded, 48 Ohio St. 2d 47, 356 N.E.2d 499 (1976).
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the fact that Ebel's was the only adult bookstore in Corona. Based on
this evidence, the city's absolute neutrality in enacting the ordinances
was made suspect. The Ninth Circuit determined that the claim
presented fair ground for litigation.22
Finally, the court considered the hardships that Ebel would face if
the preliminary injunction were denied. These were of two types. First
there was the economic hardship she would face if she were forced to
shut down, either temporarily while she relocated, or permanently if she
could not find a new site for her business. Second, and even more seri-
ous, there was the harm to Ebel's freedom of expression which the
United States Supreme Court had held to constitute irreparable injury.
2 3
The city had failed to point out any harm that it would suffer if the
bookstore stayed open during the trial on the merits. So, the balance of
hardships weighed decidedly in Ebel's favor.24
In order to sustain her claim at the trial, Judge Goodwin wrote that
Ebel would have to demonstrate that the real purpose of the ordinances
was to run her bookstore out of Corona. This would establish that the
ordinances were aimed at her, thereby violating her right to equal protec-
tion of the laws, and were a deliberate attempt to limit her freedom of
expression, thus violating her first amendment rights. The district court
was directed to carefully scrutinize the ordinances and the city's asser-
tions of harm.25
In his dissenting opinion in Mini Theatres, Justice Stewart expressed
his concern that with its decision, the Court had "shied from its responsi-
bility to protect offensive speech from governmental interference.",2' The
Ebel decision indicates that the Mini Theatres holding was not the open
door to censorship that Justice Stewart may have feared.
Although zoning ordinances may be upheld as legitimate regula-
22. Ebel, 698 F.2d at 392.
23. Id. The court cited Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (Brennan, J.) (affirming a
court of appeals judgment granting a preliminary injunction to Republican non-civil service
employees threatened with discharge when a Democratic sheriff took office). Brennan wrote,
"[t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably
constitutes irreparable injury."
24. Ebel, 698 F.2d at 392.
25. Id. "The district court should make findings on the validity of the city's assertions and
then closely scrutinize the Corona ordinance's relationship to prevention of the alleged
harms." What the district court would look for was "some rational relationship between the
objective of the Ordinance and the methods adopted" to achieve this objective. Mini Theatres.
427 U.S. at 56 n.l.
26. Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 87. Justice Stewart wrote that the Court had not shied
from its responsibility heretofore, thus implying that with the Mini Theatres decision he felt it
had.
1986]
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tions of the time, place, and manner of doing business, Ebel makes it
clear that such ordinances must be free of any taint of discrimination.
This purity must be more than merely visible on the surface. The ordi-
nances enacted in Corona were quite similar to those Detroit had en-
acted. But this facial similarity was insufficient in itself to establish the
constitutionality of the ordinances. Ebel reaffirms that any government
body which enacts legislation to regulate adult businesses must have am-
ple factual proof of the harm these businesses cause and the appropriate-
ness of the legislation as a means of preventing that harm.
A similar Ninth Circuit case, Kuzinich v. County of Santa Clara,27
decided just prior to Ebel, lends further support to this thesis. In that
case, the Ninth Circuit held that a grant of summary judgment to the
defendant county as to the validity of its zoning ordinances was im-
proper.28 In reaching its decision, the court applied the four-part test of
United States v. O'Brien.29 The court focused specifically on the third
part of the test, which required that the governmental interest which
compelled the legislation be "unrelated to the suppression of free expres-
sion."3 ° The court determined that although there was evidence to show
the ordinance was passed as a litter and traffic-control measure, there
was also evidence to indicate that its real purpose was to control
pornography.3 1
The Ninth Circuit departed somewhat from the "real purpose" test
of Ebel in Tovar v. Billmeyer 2 There the Ninth Circuit stated that to
prove zoning ordinances discriminatory, the plaintiff would have to show
that a desire to restrict its first amendment rights was "a motivating fac-
tor" in the zoning decision.33 Judge Reinhardt, writing for the court,
explained that the change in the test was necessary because Tovar
27. 689 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir. 1982) (amended January 1983).
28. Id. at 1348, 1349.
29. 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (Warren, C.J.) (upholding the conviction of a draft card burner).
Justice Powell used this test to analyze the Detroit ordinances in his concurring opinion in
Mini Theatres.
30. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. The test as stated in O'Brien reads:
[A] governmental regulation is sufficiently justified despite its incidental impact on
First Amendment interests, if it is within the constitutional power of the Govern-
ment, if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest, if the govern-
mental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.
31. Kuzinich, 689 F.2d at 1348.
32. 721 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1983). Plaintiffs owned all adult theater and bookstore in
Pocatello, Idaho. They had operated the business for three years when they relocated. They
were denied city permits and licenses for their new location.
33. Id. at 1266.
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presented a "more complicated question of the mixed motives that are
frequently present in First Amendment cases," while Ebel presented the
simpler situation where "there [was] clearly only a single purpose moti-
vating the legislative action" and the real purpose test was therefore
inadequate.34
Judge Wallace, in his concurring opinion, criticized this change in
the Ebel test because legislative actions are rarely motivated by a single
purpose, making the Ebel test rarely applicable.35 He foresaw confusion
as courts grappled with the question of which test to apply in future
cases.
36
Judge Wallace's prophecy might have been more complete if he had
predicted an increase in litigation as well as confusion resulting from the
Tovar decision. In City of Las Vegas v. Foley,37 Lydo Enterprises, a re-
spondent, claimed that Tovar allowed it to depose city officials to dis-
cover their subjective motivations for enacting zoning ordinances which
Lydo claimed were discriminatory.38 In granting the city a protective
order, the court stated that determining the motivating factor behind a
particular piece of legislation does not require looking beyond the "objec-
tive manifestations of legislative purpose to the subjective motivations of
individual legislators."
39
Whether one applies the real purpose test of Ebel or the motivating
factor test of Tovar, cases of this type should be a yellow caution light to
legislative bodies to proceed carefully in enacting zoning ordinances
which infringe on first amendment rights. The justification for such ordi-
nances and the purpose they are designed to fulfill will have to be care-
fully documented to withstand challenges to their constitutionality. It
will not be enough that ordinances seem similar in content and purpose
to those, such as the Detroit ordinances, which have been upheld as con-
34. Id. at 1267 n.7.
35. Id. at 1268.
36. Id.
37. 747 F.2d 1294 (9th Cir. 1984). Lydo Enterprises, Ltd. challenged city zoning ordi-
nances on constitutional grounds. After discovery was complete, Lydo moved to reopen,
based on Tovar. The city moved for a protective order which was denied by the magistrate and
affirmed by the district court. The city then applied to the court of appeal for a writ of prohibi-
tion and/or mandamus to order Judge Foley of the Nevada district court to grant a protective
order.
38. Id. at 1298.
39. Id. Because the objective manifestations of the council's intention to force the plain-
tiffs business out of the city were so blatant, the court stated that Tovar could hardly be held
to authorize inquiry into a lawmaking body's subjective motivations.
1986]
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stitutional. Given the delicate nature of the area, it appears likely that
the future holds a case-by-case testing of this type of zoning ordinance.
Linda Kimbell
